We consider stochastic differential games with N players, linear-Gaussian dynamics in arbitrary state-space dimension, and long-time-average cost with quadratic running cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is ergodic. We first study the existence of affine Nash equilibria by means of an associated system of N Hamilton-JacobiBellman and N Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck partial differential equations. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of quadratic-Gaussian solutions in terms of the solvability of suitable algebraic Riccati and Sylvester equations. Under a symmetry condition on the running costs and for nearly identical players we study the large population limit, N tending to infinity, and find a unique quadratic-Gaussian solution of the pair of Mean Field Game HJB-KFP equations. Examples of explicit solutions are given, in particular for consensus problems.
Introduction
We consider a system of N stochastic differential equations d is a bounded process adapted to W i t which represents the control of the i-th player of the differential game that we now describe. For each initial positions X = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ R N d we consider for the i-th player controls whose associated process is ergodic and the long-time-average cost functional with quadratic running cost
where E denotes the expected value, R i are positive definite symmetric d × d matrices, Q i are symmetric N d × N d matrices, and X i ∈ R N d are given reference positions. For this N -person game we study the following two problems: 1. the synthesis of Nash equilibrium strategies in feedback form, and of the probability distribution for the position of each player at the equilibrium, from a system of elliptic partial differential equations associated to the game, 2. the large population limits as N → ∞ of these strategies and distributions and their connection with the Mean-Field Games partial differential equations introduced by Lasry and Lions [27, 29] .
The first problem is classicaly formulated within the theory of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations associated to N -person differential games, as was done in [8, 9] for compact state space. This leads to a system of N PDEs in R N d strongly coupled in the gradients of the unknown value functions. Instead, we exploit the independence of the dynamics of different players, that makes the game merely cost-coupled, and follow the approach of Lasry and Lions [27, 29] leading to a system of N nonlinear PDEs in R d of H-J-B type coupled with N Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equations for the invariant measure of the process associated to the Nash equilibrium. This has several advantages, including a much weaker coupling of the new system of PDEs. We refer to [3] for more information on the connections between the two approaches. In view of the Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian structure of the game we look for solutions of the HJB-KFP system in the class of quadratic value functions and multivariate Gaussian distributions and give necessary and sufficient conditions for both existence and uniqueness of solutions in this class. This produces Nash equilibria in the form of affine feedbacks.
The second problem is set in the framework of nearly identical players, as in [2] . We first characterize the existence and uniqueness of identically distributed solutions, then take the limit of these solutions as N → ∞ and show that it solves the system of two Mean-Field Games PDEs 
in the unknowns (v, m, λ), with v quadratic, m Gaussian distribution, and λ ∈ R, where tr and div are the trace of a matrix and the divergence operator, respectively, andV [m] is an integral operator sending probability densities into quadratic polynomials defined in terms of the blocks of the matrix Q i . We also show that such solution is unique among merely C 2 solutions under a condition on a submatrix of Q i meaning that imitation is not rewarding in the large population limit. Finally we give examples of explicit formulas for the solutions of (3). In particular they hold when the cost functional depends on the state via the quadratic form
with P N →P > 0, a model arising in consensus problems, where we show the existence of a quadratic-Gaussian solution with mean µ for each solution of A i µ = 0. Therefore such solutions can be infinitely many: note that here imitation is rewarding.
Most of the results of this paper and explicit formulas for the solutions were derived by the first-named author in [2] in the case of 1-dimensional state space, i.e., d = 1, where the analysis is much simpler because the search for quadratic-Gaussian solutions leads to scalar polynomial equations of degree at most two. For d > 1, instead, we arrive at some nontrivial algebraic Riccati equations coupled with Sylvester equations that require a much heavier use of matrix algebra and do not admit explicit solutions in general. In a sequel of the present paper [34] the second-named author studies several singular limits of the N -person and Mean-Field games considered here, such as the vanishing viscosity, the cheap control, and the vanishing discount limit.
Linear-Quadratic differential games have a large literature, see the books [6, 17] and the references therein. Large population limits for multi-agent systems were studied by Huang, Caines and Malhame, independently of Lasry-Lions. They introduced a method named Nash certainty equivalence principle [22, 23, 24] that first produces a feedback from a mean-field equation and then shows that it is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the N -person game if N is large enough. We cannot review here the number of papers inspired by their approach, but let us mention [31] and [11] for LQ problems, [7] about robust control, [32] for recent progress on nonlinear systems, [33] for consensus problems, [26] on the rate of convergence as N → ∞, and the references therein. Some of these papers also deal with ergodic cost functionals, e.g., [24, 31] , but their assumptions and methods differ from ours.
Concerning the Lasry-Lions approach to MFG, besides their pioneering papers [27, 28, 29] let us mention the lecture notes [14] and [21] , [1] on numerical methods, [19] on discrete games, [15] on the long time behaviour of solutions, and [18] on the large population limit for nonlinear ergodic control of several populations. A very recent survey on MFG as well as the more classical theory of mean-field control is [10] . There is a wide spectrum of applications of MeanField Games that we do not try to list here and refer instead to the quoted literature.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we define admissible strategies, introduce the system of HJB-KFP PDEs associated to the N -person game and recall some known facts about matrices and algebraic Riccati equations. In Section 3 we present our main result about Nash equilibrium strategies for the N -players game. In Section 4 we define the games with nearly identical players and give the existence and uniqueness result in that case. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of the limit when the number of players tends to infinity, under natural rescaling assumptions on the matrix coefficients of the game. Finally, in Section 6 we present various explicit sufficient conditions for the validity of the previous theory and some explicit solutions, in particular for consensus problems.
Some selected results of this paper were presented at the 52nd IEEE-CDC in Florence, December 2013 [5] .
Preliminaries

Some properties of symmetric matrices
In the following, we will use the notation Mat d×d (R) for the linear space of real d × d matrices, Sym d for the subspace of real symmetric d × d matrices and I d for the identical d × d matrix.
Given a matrix M ∈ Sym d , we say that M is positive semidefinite (resp. positive definite) if for all x ∈ R d there holds
there holds x T M x > 0). We will also use the notation Sym Finally, given a (real) d × d matrix M , we denote its spectrum by spec(M ). Recall that eigenvalues of a matrix M depend continuously on the coefficients of the matrix (see [35] ), so that if we have M n → M , then in particular the eigenvalues of M n converge to eigenvalues of M .
We summarize in the following proposition some facts that will be used to prove our results.
Proposition 2.1
The following facts hold.
(i) Let H ∈ Sym d be positive semidefinite and K ∈ Sym + d . Then their products HK is diagonalizable with real eigenvalues. Moreover, the number of positive (resp. negative) eigenvalues of HK is equal to the number of positive (resp. negative) eigenvalues of H. The same holds for KH.
(ii) By defining for every matrix M ∈ Sym d M := max {|ℓ| ; ℓ ∈ spec(M )} ,
we obtain a norm. Moreover, if M is positive semidefinite, then M is simply the largest eigenvalue of M , i.e. M = max spec(M ) .
(iii) Let H, K ∈ Sym d be positive semidefinite matrices and let L ∈ Sym
Sketch of the proof. We refer to [35] for a proof of (i) and (ii). Concerning (iii), the part about H ≥ K follows from Weyl's inequalities (see [35] ): by setting λ * (M ) := max spec(M ), we obtain
The remaining part requires to recall that the spectrum of a matrix remains the same under changes of basis, and that
and this completes the proof. ⋄
Admissible strategies
We consider strategies whose corresponding solution to (1) is ergodic.
Definition 2.1 A strategy α i is said to be admissible (for the i-th player) if it is a bounded process adapted to the Brownian motion W i t such that the corresponding solution X i t to (1) satisfies
• X i t is ergodic in the following sense: there exists a probability measure
locally uniformly w.r.t. the initial state X i 0 , for all functions g which are polynomials of degree at most 2.
One can prove that affine strategies are admissible. Namely, the following proposition follows by standard arguments in stochastic differential equations, see [16, 25] .
Remark 2.1 Note that the equation (7) satisfied by the covariance matrix V admits a unique solution. Indeed, it is a Sylvester equation of the form
with M = N T , so that the matrices M and −N have no eigenvalues in common (see [17] ).
Proof of Proposition 2.2. It is well known (see for instance Theorem 4.3 in [13] ) that given a matrix M ∈ Mat d×d (R) whose eigenvalues have all strictly negative real part, it is always possible to find a matrix P ∈ Sym + d such that M T P + P M = −I. We now claim that, by denoting with P i the symmetric positive definite matrix corresponding to
x is a Lyapunov-like function for the system (6). Indeed, by denoting with L the infinitesimal generator of the process, we have
which is strictly negative outside a ball of radius R >
Hence, the existence of a unique invariant measure m i for (6) follows by exploiting the theory of Khasminskii [25] or the results in [4] . Observing that if a unique invariant measure exists, then such a measure is also ergodic in the sense of Definition 2.1 (see e.g. Theorem 5.16 in [16] ), we have verified the second property required by admissibility.
It is well know that for solutions of linear stochastic equations (6) the mean vector m i (t) := E[X 
T ] are respectively solutions oḟ
whence boundedness of first and second moments follows. Finally, since a multivariate Gaussian N (µ, V ) with µ = (A i − K i ) −1 c i and V solving (7) is indeed a stationary solution of (6) , by uniqueness we get m i = N (µ, V ). ⋄
Algebraic Riccati equations
We recall here some basic facts about algebraic Riccati equations (ARE in the following). 
where S is any element of Mat d×d (R), and Im Ξ S for the d-dimensional linear subspace of R (ii) If the matrix H has no purely imaginary nonzero eigenvalues, then equation
(iii) If Q is positive definite, then all eigenvalues of H are real and different from zero, and equation (8) has a unique symmetric solution Y such that the matrix RY has only positive eigenvalues. In particular,
and Y is also the unique symmetric positive definite solution to (8) .
Sketch of the proof. The proof follows from standard arguments about Riccati equations that can be found in [17, 30] . We give here some explicit references for sake of completeness. Part (i) is contained in Proposition 7.1.1 of [30] . Part (ii) is a particular case of Theorem 8.1.7 in [30] . Concerning (iii), if we assume Q positive definite, then ℓ is an eigenvalue for H if and only if ℓ is a solution of the equation
i.e. if and only if ℓ 2 is an eigenvalue of the d × d matrix RQ. But we are assuming that both R and Q are positive definite, so RQ has only positive eigenvalues and therefore all eigenvalues of H are in R \ {0}. Now Theorem 8.3.2 of [30] ensures that there is a unique solution Y of (8) in Sym d such that RY has only positive eigenvalues and such solution is characterized by (10) . In turn, (10) implies that Y ∈ Sym 
HJB and KFP equations associated to the N-person game
We focus our attention on the game (1)- (2) , in order to write the system of HJB-KFP equations associated to the game (1)-(2), as in [2, 27, 29] . We start by remarking that the part of the cost depending on the state of the game can be also written as
where the matrices Q 
For the game (1)- (2) under consideration, we observe that the i-th Hamiltonian takes the form
Since the minimum is attained at (R i ) −1 p, we get
Introducing the notations
for any N -vector of probability measures (m 1 , . . . , m N ), and
the system of HJB-KFP equations associated to the game is
where v i are scalar functions, λ i are real numbers and, with a slight abuse of notations, we have denoted with m i a measure as well as its density. As in [2] , since we are not in the periodic setting of [27, 29] the solutions v i are expected to be unbounded and cannot be normalized by prescribing the value of their average.
N -person game
First of all, define the following auxiliary matrix B ∈ Mat N d×N d (R) as
where δ αβ is the Kronecker delta, and an auxiliary vector
Also, denote with [B, P ] ∈ Mat N d×(N d+1) (R) the matrix whose columns are the columns of B and the vector P , i.e.
being B j the columns of the matrix B. With these notations we can state the following conditions for existence and uniqueness of solution to the associated system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equations.
(E) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, every symmetric and positive definite solution Y of the algebraic Riccati equation
is also a solution to the Sylvester equation
Moreover, the matrices B ∈ Mat N d×N d (R) and [B, P ] ∈ Mat N d×(N d+1) (R) have the same rank, where B is the matrix defined in (14), P is the vector defined in (15) , and [B, P ] is the matrix defined in (16) .
(U) The block matrix B defined by (14) is invertible.
Some explicit conditions on the data ensuring (E) are discussed in Section 6. Our main result for the games with N players is the following.
Theorem 1
Assume that the N -players game having dynamics (1) and costs (2) satisfies assumptions (H). Then, the associated system of 2N HJB-KFP equations (13) admits solutions
of the form v i quadratic function and m i multivariate Gaussian, i.e. of the form
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ i and Σ i , Σ i positive definite, and vectors ρ i , µ i , if and only if condition (E) is satisfied. Moreover, solutions of the form (19) are unique if and only if condition (U) is satisfied and, if this is the case, the affine feedbacks
provide a Nash equilibrium strategy for all initial positions X ∈ R N d , among the admissible strategies, and J i (X, α) = λ i for all X and all i.
Proof. The proof will be divided in several steps. Steps 1 to 4 study the particular form taken by system (13) when solutions are assumed to have the form (19) .
Step 5 proves the equivalence between existence and (E).
Step 6 proves the equivalence between uniqueness and (U). Finally,
Step 7 shows that the affine strategies (20) give a Nash equilibrium for the game (1)-(2).
Step 1. We start by inserting functions of the form (19) into the system (13) . Notice that the hypothesis on the measure m i can be rewritten in terms of its density, which we denote again as m i , as follows
for a matrix Σ i ∈ Sym
Similarly, the condition on the value function can be rewritten in terms of its gradient as follows
Hence, by substituting these expressions in the second equation of (13) and recalling the expressions of H i and ∇m i , we obtain
Since m i (x) > 0, this means that the other factor must vanish for every x ∈ R d . Being a quadratic form, this means that all terms must be identically zero and in turn this leads to the following matrix relations
In conclusion, necessary and sufficient condition for having solutions to the KFP equation, of the form (19) , is that the value function v i is related to the measure m i through
where the equality for Λ i also imposes that the matrix
Step 2. Let us consider now the first equation of (13) . By exploiting (24), we have
hence the equation can be rewritten as
Taking into account that R i , ν i , and Σ i are all symmetric matrices, the term in the second line vanishes and we obtain
We can now exploit (21) to compute explicitly the expression of
where we have used the relation
T M µ, which holds for any symmetric matrix M and any vector of random variables v whose expected value is µ and whose covariance matrix is Σ −1 , to compute explicitly the last quadratic term. For later use, we write explicitly the expressions of
Once again, we can interpret equation (25) , which is equivalent to the first equation of (13), as an equality between quadratic forms to be satisfied for every x ∈ R d . This means that we must equate the corresponding coefficients. Notice that the assumption of Q i symmetric in (11) 
T and the two conditions on the linear terms
do coincide. This leads to three conditions on the coefficients of the quadratic forms which have to be satisfied by the matrices Σ i , the vectors µ i and the real numbers λ i .
Step 3. Notice that (26) is equivalent to say that Σ i solves an ARE of the form (8) with
Hence, its solutions can be found as d-dimensional invariant graph subspaces of the 2d × 2d matrix H defined in (9) . Since our standing assumptions (H) imply that both R and Q are positive definite, we can apply Proposition 2.3 (ii)-(iii) to conclude that (26) has a unique solution Σ i in Sym + d , representing the inverse of the covariance matrix for our multivariate Gaussian m i .
Step 4. Concerning (27), we can rewrite the condition as
or equivalently, by collecting the relations (29) 
where B is the N d × N d matrix defined in (14) and P is the vector in R N d defined by (15) . Here, we have also used the fact that each Σ p solves the Riccati equation (26) to rewrite the terms B pp as
i.e. in the form expected in (14) . Finally, (28) becomes
Step 5. So far we have mostly manipulated the equations of (13), under the assumptions (19), arriving to an equivalent system of matrix equations (24), (26), (27) , and (28). Now let us assume that condition (E) holds. We have seen that each equation (26), for i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, is an ARE which admits a unique symmetric and positive definite solution Σ i . By (E), the matrices Σ i also satisfy the Sylvester equation (18) and thus
so that, by setting Λ i according to the first relation in (24), we obtain a symmetric matrix as required. Moreover, the assumption on B and [B, P ] in (E) ensures the existence of a solution (µ 1 , . . . , µ N ) to the linear system (30) of N d equations in N d unknowns. By using the solutions Σ i and µ i in (28) and in the second relation of (24), we also find admissible values λ i and ρ i , and these complete the construction of a solution of the form (19) .
Viceversa, let us assume that a solution of the form (19) (24) . Furthermore, by the analysis in Step 2, Σ i must solve the ARE (26) and µ i and λ i must be given by solutions to (27) and (28). In particular, the system (30) admits at least a solution, and this implies the condition on the rank of B and [B, P ]. Finally, by combining the symmetry of Λ i with (24), one has that the (unique) solution to (26) has to satisfy
which is equivalent to (18) . Thus, both requirements of (E) must be necessarily satisfied.
Step 6. We now focus our attention on the uniqueness. For (26) there is nothing to prove, because uniqueness of solution in Sym + d always follows from Proposition 2.3, under hypotheses (H). For (27) , the equivalence between (U) and the uniqueness of solution (µ 1 , . . . , µ N ) is evident when considering the equivalent form (30) . Finally, once we have a unique choice for the matrices (Σ 1 , . . . , Σ N ) and for the vectors (µ 1 , . . . , µ N ), the uniqueness of λ i , Λ i and ρ i is verified immediately.
Step 7. It remains to prove that the affine feedbacks (20) provide a Nash equilibrium strategy for the game. Consider
By Proposition 2.2, we know that α i (x) is admissible and that the ergodic measure associated to the process X i t which solves
is a multivariate Gaussian N (µ, V ) with mean
and covariance matrix V = (
and the equation (7) admits a unique solution (see Remark 2.1). In other words, the invariant measure coincides with the measure m i satisfying (21) .
We now consider any other admissible strategy α i and observe that Dynkin's formula gives
Hence, from ν i = σ i (σ i ) T /2 and the fact that the map (x, y) → x T R i y is an inner product, one obtains
with equality holding if α i = α i . Therefore, the first equation in (13) implies
Hence, by dividing by T and letting T → +∞, we get
because the left hand side of the original inequality vanishes due to v i being quadratic and the strategies being admissible (and therefore E[
T ] ≤ C for some constant C).
It remains to prove that the right hand side of (31) is
, which means that the cost λ i corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. This property follows from the ergodicity. Indeed, let us consider the probability measures
which are the invariant measures corresponding to the solution (X 
where we have also used the ergodicity of the pair (X j t , X k t ) with corresponding measure given by the product measure obtained fromm j andm k . In conclusion, the right hand side of (31) is J i (X, α 1 , . . . α i−1 , α i , α i+1 , . . . , α N ) and this completes the proof. ⋄ Remark 3.1 Looking at the formulas (19) and (24) it might seem that the Nash equilibrium strategies depend on the noise σ i , through ν i , which is typically not the case in LQ stochastic problems. In fact, this is not the case in our problem either: by introducing new variables V i := ν i Σ i , it is immediate to verify that the feedback strategies only depend on these new variables V i , which are determined by the equations
and thus do not depend on the noise statistics σ i . The same holds for the equilibrium strategies of Theorem 2 in the next Section. This allows to take the small noise or vanishing viscosity limit ν i → 0 under some additional conditions, extending the results on the case d = 1 in [2] , see the sequel of this paper [34] .
Nearly identical players
In this section we introduce assumptions saying that the players are almost identical, as in [2] , and prove that there exists a Nash equilibrium with the same feedback and the same distribution for all players, although the values can be different. The first condition is a Symmetry assumption on the cost of each player: (S) every player is influenced in the same way by other players, i.e. for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and each j, k = i
We can easily prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Assumption (S) holds if and only if there exist matrices
Under assumption (S), the quadratic costs F i take the following form
In particular, they can be written in the form usually arising in mean field games, namely
where δ X j is the Dirac measure on R d centered in the point X j and V i is the operator, mapping probability measures m on R d into quadratic polynomials, defined by the expression
Indeed, it is enough to recall that for any choice of vectors w 1 , . . . , w N and of an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, there holds
Definition 4.1 We say that the players are nearly identical if costs F i satisfy (S) and if all players have the same:
• control systems, i.e. A i = A and σ i = σ (and therefore ν i = ν) for all i,
• costs of the control, i.e. R i = R for all i,
• reference positions, i.e. X i i = H (own reference position, or happy place) and ∆ i = ∆ (reference position of the other players) for all i,
• primary costs of displacement, i.e. Q i ii = Q and B i = B for all i.
Note that the players are not fully identical because the secondary costs of displacement C i and D i can be different among them. Observe that in this framework, the hypotheses (H) specialize to det(σ) = 0 , R ∈ Sym
Let us rewrite part of the computations from the previous section for nearly identical players. First of all, the right hand side f i (12) of the HJB equation becomes, for given measures
Hence, if we search for identically distributed solutions for all players, i.e. if we search for measures of the form
Let us investigate the existence of solutions such that
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ, Σ, with Σ positive definite, suitable vectors µ, ρ and a suitable constant γ depending only on the matrix Σ and on the dimension of the space. By repeating the same computations done in Section 3, it is immediate to verify that the KFP equation in (13) for the measure reduces, as in (24), to the matrix relations
By interpreting again the HJB equation for the value function in (13) as an equality between quadratic forms we obtain the system of equations
with
In particular, the first equation (35) has exactly the same form as (26), i.e. it is again an ARE which admits a unique solution Σ in Sym + d , under hypotheses (32) . By plugging (35) into (36) this can be rewritten as
which admits a unique solution µ ∈ R d whenever the matrix
is invertible. Finally, once Σ and µ have been found, they can be used in the third equation (37) and in (34) to obtain the values λ i ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , N , the matrix Λ and the vector ρ. For nearly identical players the appropriate analogs of the conditions (E) and (U) are the following.
(E ′ ) Every symmetric and positive definite solution Y of the algebraic Riccati equation
Moreover, the matrices B ′ ∈ Mat d×d (R) and [B ′ , P ′ ] ∈ Mat d×(d+1) (R) have the same rank, where B ′ is the matrix defined in (38),
2 ∆, and [B ′ , P ′ ] is defined as in (16) .
It is immediate to verify that the analysis performed above proves the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Consider an N -players game with dynamics (1) and costs (2) . Assume that players are nearly identical and that (32) holds. Then, the associated system of 2N HJB-KFP equations ( 
provide a Nash equilibrium strategy for all initial positions X ∈ R N d , among the admissible strategies, and J i (X, α) = λ i for all X and all i = 1, . . . , N . (14) is a stronger requirement than the invertibility of the matrix B ′ in (38). Indeed, if we take a game such that Q + A T RA/2 = B/2 , then B consists of blocks B αβ = −B ∈ Mat d×d (R) for all α, β = 1, . . . , N , and thus is not invertible since it satisfies rank(B) = rank(B) ≤ d. On the other hand, the matrix B ′ = N B/2 is invertible, provided B is invertible. Therefore there can be infinitely many quadratic-Gaussian solutions although only one of them is identically distributed, see [2] for an explicit example.
Remark 4.1 Note that the invertibility of B in
The large population limit
In this section we study the convergence of Nash equilibria when the number N of players goes to infinity. Assume for simplicity that the control system, the costs of the control and the reference positions are always the same, i.e. that A, σ, R, H and ∆ are all independent from the number of players N . We denote with
the primary and secondary costs of displacement, respectively, which are assumed to depend on N . We assume that these quantities, when N → +∞, tends to suitable matricesQ,B,Ĉ,D with their natural scaling, i.e. as N → +∞ there holds
We define an operator acting on probability measures m ∈ P(R d ) that describes the cost for an average player of the density m of the other playerŝ
It is easy to verify that, as N → +∞, for all i and all m ∈ P(R d )
By denoting with λ i N , v N and m N the solutions found in Theorem 2 of Section 4, we expect that the limits of these solutions satisfy, like in [2, 27, 29] , the system of two mean field HJB-KFP equations
Along the lines of hypotheses (H), the natural assumptions on the coefficients of (42) are the following ν ∈ Sym
We look for solutions of (42) such that
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ, Σ, with Σ positive definite, suitable vectors µ, ρ and a suitable constant γ depending only on the matrix Σ and on the dimension of the space. By repeating the computations done in Sections 3 and 4, it is immediate to verify that the KFP equation for the measure in (42) reduces to the matrix equations
Concerning the HJB equation for the value function, one can proceed as in the previous sections, obtaining the system of matrix equations
In particular, under assumptions (43), the first equation is an ARE which admits a unique solution Σ in Sym + d . Also, we can rewrite the second equality in the form
which admits a unique solution µ whenever the matrix
is invertible. Finally, once Σ and µ have been found, one can insert them into the third equation and (45) to obtain the value λ, the matrix Λ and the vector ρ required by (44). In this case, the existence and uniquess of solutions to (42) is then related to the following conditions.
(E ∞ ) The symmetric and positive definite solution Y of the algebraic Riccati equation
Moreover, the matrices B ∞ ∈ Mat d×d (R) and [B ∞ , P ∞ ] ∈ Mat d×(d+1) (R) have the same rank, where B ∞ is the matrix defined in (49), P ∞ := −QH +B 2 ∆ ∈ R d and [B ∞ , P ∞ ] is defined analogously to (16) .
The main results of this section are the following two theorems. A natural question is whether the PDE system (42) has other solutions that are not quadraticGaussian. We add a normalization condition on v, to avoid addition of constants, and make a simple assumption that ensures the monotonicity ofV with respect to the scalar product in the Lebesgue space L 2 . Then an argument of Lasry and Lions implies uniqueness [27, 29] . 
Theorem 4 The integral operatorV satisfies
where Σ N and µ N solve equations (35) and (36), respectively, Λ N and ρ N are given in terms of Σ N and µ N by (34) , and γ N is a constant depending only on d and the matrix Σ N . To pass to the limit as N → +∞ in the ARE (35) we first note that (35) and (46) are both AREs of the form (8) with
and the corresponding 2d × 2d matrices of the form (9) are given by
Next, we claim that the sequence Σ N is bounded w.r.t. the norm of the largest eigenvalue, which was introduced in (4). Indeed, by property (iii) of Proposition 2.3
and the convergence H N → H implies the convergence of the eigenvalues. Hence, for N large enough max spec(RΣ N ) ≤ max spec(H) ∩ (0, +∞) + 1 and in particular the maximum eigenvalue of RΣ N is bounded. Since R is symmetric positive definite, this implies that Σ N is bounded as well. Indeed, by denoting with λ min > 0 the smallest eigenvalue of R, we have R − λ min I d ≥ 0 and
thanks to Proposition 2.1-(iii). Therefore, Σ N has a converging subsequence, that we denote with Σ N k , whose limit Σ satisfies (46), i.e.,
If we can prove that Σ ∈ Sym Recalling again that R is symmetric positive definite, Σ cannot have zero as eigenvalue and this proves that the limit of Σ N k is Σ. Since we can repeat this argument to show that every subsequence of Σ N has a convergent subsequence whose limit is Σ, we conclude that Σ N → Σ as N → +∞. Concerning the convergence of µ N to µ, we know that these vectors are respectively solutions to the linear systems B
where B ′ N was defined in (38), B ∞ was defined in (49), and the vector P ′ N , P ∞ are given, as in the previous sections, by
Here we use that the matrix B ∞ is invertible by (U ∞ Finally, by passing to the limit in the explicit formulas (34) and (37)
it is easy to verify that Λ N → Λ, ρ N → ρ and λ i N → λ for each i and this completes the proof. ⋄ Proof of Theorem 4. For any m, n ∈ P(R d )
Observe that only the first term of this expression depends on the variable x. Then
The first term can be written as
The second term can be treated in the same way, leading to
It is now clear that ifB is positive definite, then
all probability measures m, n. Viceversa, for every fixed vector η ∈ R d , we can consider the multivariate Gaussian measures m = N (η, I d ) and n = N (0, I d ) on R d , and apply the inequality above to obtain
which impliesB ≥ 0. This completes the proof of the equivalence between monotonicity of the operatorV and the positive semi-definitess ofB. The uniqueness of solutions whenB ≥ 0 can be proved by the same arguments of [2, 27, 29] . ⋄
Examples
So far we have used the abstract condition (E) with (U) to translate the existence and uniqueness of solutions having the form (19) to the system of PDEs (13) into algebraic matrix equations. In this section we show that in some cases such conditions can be easily verified and the solution to the PDEs (13) can be computed explicitly. For simplicity we limit ourselves to nearly identical players and the Mean-Field game. Therefore we focus on the corresponding conditions (E ′ ) and (U ′ ). In the last part we discuss some consensus models for which infinitely many solutions can be exhibited.
Symmetric system
Consider an N -players game with dynamics (1) and costs (2) and assume that (H) holds, that players are nearly identical and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N } (a) the dynamics (1) involve drift matrices A i ≡ A ∈ Sym d and diffusion matrices σ = sI d with s ∈ R \ {0}; (b) the matrix R in the control costs (2) satisfies R = rI d with r > 0.
Then it is easy to verify the part of (E ′ ) concerning solutions of (39) and (40). Indeed, both matrices ν = s
and R commute with any other matrix. Then, Sylvester's equation (40) can be rewritten as
i.e. it reduces to a symmetry condition on A, which is ensured by (a). Moreover, an explicit expression of the matrix Σ can be calculated. Indeed, the matrix 2 r Q − A 2 is symmetric and positive definite and thus admits a square root E ∈ Sym + d , i.e.,
If we now consider the ARE (35), we find that
To verify the part of condition (E ′ ) dealing with the matrix B ′ , we assume in addition, using the notations of Lemma 4.1, (c) the primary costs of displacement B i in Q i satisfy B i = B ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Then we can rewrite (38) as
so B ′ is invertible and both (E ′ ) and (U ′ ) are satisfied. Thus the linear system (36) has the unique solution
where H and ∆ are the reference positions of the players, as in Definition 4.1. Now the expressions found for Σ and µ can be used in (34) and (37) to obtain Λ, ρ and λ 1 , . . . λ N , completing the explicit construction of the unique solution of quadratic-Gaussian type.
In conclusion, for games with N nearly identical players which satisfy (H), conditions (a), (b) and (c) are sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique solution to (13) of the form (33) , and hence of a unique affine Nash equilibrium strategy given by
For the large population limit we assume that the scaled coefficients satisfy (41) as N → +∞ and
Once again, Sylvester's equation reduces to the symmetry of A, the solution to ARE (46) can be given explicitly as Σ = is immediate. Moreover, it is easy to verify that Σ N → Σ and that µ N → µ, which in turn imply convergence of the unique solution to the N -players game to the unique solution of the Men-Field game (42).
Remark 6.1
The equivalence between A symmetric and Sylvester's equation implies that if A is not symmetric condition (E ′ ) fails and therefore no solution of (13) with a quadratic value function exists. Indeed, in this case one gets an affine vector q(x) = Λx + ρ which solves, together with a multivariate Gaussian m, the equation
but q is not the gradient of a quadratic function of the form (33), because Λ / ∈ Sym d .
Non-defective system
In this section we extend the previous analysis beyond the symmetry assumption on the drift matrix A to the case of A non-defective. We recall that a matrix M ∈ Mat d×d (R) is said to be non-defective if, for every eigenvalue λ ∈ spec(M ), the corresponding eigenspace has dimension equal to the multiplicity of λ or, equivalently, when there exists a base of R d consisting of right (or left) eigenvectors of M . 
(ii) If M is non-defective, then the symmetrizer Y can be chosen positive definite.
(iii) If M is non-defective and we consider a linear stochastic differential equation
then there exists a linear change of coordinates x → ξ such that (53) can be rewritten in the form
with M symmetric matrix andσ invertible.
Sketch of the proof. We refer to [36] for the proof of (i).
(ii) Bhaskar proved in [12] that the real symmetrizer Y can be chosen of the explicit form 
This completes the proof. ⋄
Observe that, if we consider a differential game with N nearly identical players, dynamics (1) and costs (2) and if we assume that the drift matrix A is non-defective, then we can perform the change of coordinate in Proposition 6.1 to pass to a new SDE with symmetric drift. Let us denote, as in the proof of the proposition, with Y = P T Z 2 P the symmetrizer matrix for M with P orthogonal matrix and Z diagonal and positive definite matrix. Then, the new game will have costs given by
and the matrices R and Q i jk are given by
for the same matrices Z ∈ Sym it is possible to repeat the arguments of Sect. 6.1, after the change of coordinates ξ = ZP x, and to prove that for games with N nearly identical players satisfying (H), (a ′ ), (b ′ ) and (c) there exists a unique solution to (13) of the form (33) . Similar conditions in the case of A only non-defective can be given for the limit problem (42) as well.
Remark 6.2 These arguments apply to general N -players games too, without the assumption of nearly identical players, whenever all drift matrices A 1 , . . . , A N are symmetric or simultaneously symmetrizable (i.e., if the symmetrizers Y 1 , . . . , Y N given by Proposition 6.1 coincide). For more general games one has either to require that more blocks of the cost matrices Q i are null or to study the N d dimensional linear SDE for X t = (X 1 t , . . . , X N t ).
Consensus models
In this section we apply the previous theory to some simple models of consensus in multi-agent systems inspired by [33] to which we refer for motivations and bibliography. Consider costs whose part depending on the state is
with P N ∈ Sym 
and reference states H = ∆ = 0. Assume also that the dynamics and cost of the control is the same for all players, so that they are nearly identical. For simplicity suppose also the conditions (a) and (b) of Section 6.1, although the analysis can be carried over to merely non-defective matrices A.
The matrix B ′ defined in (38) is 
and the Nash feedback equilibrium is α N (x) = Ax + 1 ν 2 r P N − A 2 (x − µ) .
In particular, there is a unique solution if and only if det A = 0 and then the mean is µ = 0. The large population limit is straightforward if we assume that P N →P > 0 as N → ∞. Remark 6.4 The existence of infinitely many Gaussian solutions in a Mean-Field Game model of population distribution with rewarding imitation among players was first observed by Guéant [20] . In [2] the LQ Mean-Field Game of Section 5 was studied for d = 1, A = 0, and H = ∆ and it was observed that forQ = −B/2 there is a unique quadratic-Gaussian solution with µ = H, whereas forQ = −B/2 there are infinitely many, one for any µ ∈ R d .
Remark 6.5 Analogous computations can be made also for consensus models where the dynamics and cost of the control are not the same for all players. In such a case, the matrix B ′ above is replaced by the matrix B defined in (14) which becomes here (26) . In fact, owing to known formulas for matrices of the form (58), it is possible to prove that the invertibility of B is equivalent to N α=1 Ker(A α ) = {0}, providing a complete understanding of the conditions required to have a unique QG solution for this consensus model.
